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Abstract  
The aim of this article is to help identify the fundamental characteristics of the British 
policymaking system.  It highlights an enduring conflict of interpretation within the 
literature.  On the one hand, most contemporary analysts argue that the ‘Westminster 
model’ is outmoded and it has been replaced by modern understandings based on 
‘governance’.  On the other, key ideas associated with the Westminster Model, 
regarding majoritarian government and policy imposition, are still in good currency in 
the academic literature which holds firm to Lijphart’s (1984; 1999) description of the 
UK as a majoritarian democracy.  These very different understandings of British 
government are both commonly cited, but without much recognition that their 
conclusions may be mutually incompatible. To address this lack of comparison of 
competing narratives, the article outlines two main approaches to describe and explain 
the ‘characteristic and durable’ ways of doing things in Britain: the ‘policy styles’ 
literature initiated by Richardson in Policy Styles in Western Europe (1982) and the 
Lijphart account found in Democracies (1984) and revised in 1999 as Patterns of 
Democracy. The article encourages scholars to reject an appealing compromise 
between majoritarian and governance accounts.   
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Introduction 
The aim of this article is to identify the fundamental characteristics of the British 
policymaking system.  It highlights an enduring conflict of interpretation within the 
literature.  On the one hand, there is the proposition that the ‘Westminster model’, 
which stresses majoritarian government and policy imposition, is both overstated and 
now outmoded.  Most contemporary analysts dwell on the shortcomings of the 
Westminster account and  compare it with a more realistic framework based on 
modern discussions of governance (for example, Rhodes, 1997; Bache and Flinders, 
2004).  Marsh (2008; 2011) suggests that this reformulation process is complete, and 
that the Westminster model is no longer seen as realistic.  Instead, Rhodes’ 
‘differentiated policy model’ has become the ‘the dominant model of British politics’ 
or the ‘new orthodoxy’.  Similarly, Kerr and Kettell (2006: 11) describe the “formal 
supplanting of the Westminster model with that of the ‘governance’ thesis” which has 
become the ‘dominant organising perspective within the field of British politics’.  An 
important implication of this focus on governance is that key features of the British 
system are shared with many other political systems, since variants of the governance 
narrative can be identified in most developed countries (Cairney, 2012a: 171-4).  In 
short, it can be argued that Britain has moved away from a distinctive Westminster 
model towards a universal governance model.   
 
On the other hand, the ideas associated with the Westminster Model are still in good 
currency, not only in the minds of politicians and the media coverage of British 
politics (Cairney, 2012c; see also Blunkett and Richards, 2011 on the ‘British Political 
Tradition’), but also in key parts of the academic literature.  In particular, Lijphart’s 
(1984; 1999) description of the UK as a majoritarian democracy is still influential - 
particularly when reinforced in modern interpretations of UK central government by 
respected academics such as Flinders (2005; 2010; Flinders and Curry, 2008).  Such 
accounts suggest not only that the UK displays a concentration of power in the centre, 
and a strong tendency towards top-down policymaking and imposition, but also that 
its policymaking style contrasts with the ‘consensus democracies’ found in many of 
the Nordic countries and, since 1999, the devolved UK territories.  Indeed, Flinders 
(2010) highlights ‘bi-constitutionality’ in the UK following the concurrent 
development of consensual devolved regimes and a majoritarian UK central 
government.  In short, for some observers, British government is still based on its 
traditional Westminster-majoritarian characteristics and its style of government differs 
from many, if not most, political systems.   
 
These very different understandings of British government, based on governance and 
the diffusion of power on one hand, and majoritarianism and the concentration of 
power on the other, seem to run on parallel tracks with remarkably few meaningful 
interactions.  Arguably there are three main factors sustaining these competing 
images.  First, few direct comparisons are made.  The ‘governance’ thesis is rarely 
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compared to a strong competitor.  Instead, it is set up as superior to the strawman 
Westminster Model which was already damaged as a description of British 
government before the governance account took off.  Further, the majoritarian image 
endures in comparative politics because multiple-country studies do not take into 
account the literature on group-government relations and governance in the UK.  
Instead, the UK is used as a convenient shorthand marker of an extreme majoritarian 
position and the actual UK character is rarely compared with reality.   
 
Second, it is possible that the two models describe different processes or objects of 
study.  Lijphart’s model perhaps helps describe the ‘headline’ decisions taken at the 
centre of political systems; the practices that dominate media attention but represent a 
tiny proportion of government business.  If so, the governance image describes almost 
everything else: the day-to-day running of government, and the bulk of policymaking 
and its outcomes, which is less exciting but may be much more important.  The latter 
is what Freeman (1985: 467) has in mind when he seeks to identify the dominant 
‘policy styles’ within political systems.  He observes that when political science 
generalises about practice, a common expectation is that, ‘policy makers develop 
characteristic and durable methods for dealing with public issues, and these can be 
linked to policy outcomes’.    
 
Third, some (but not all) versions of the governance thesis may have come to 
incorporate the majoritarian image into their overarching accounts.  They suggest that 
British governments may generally attempt to centralise power and act in a top-down 
way before becoming frustrated by the constraints to policymaking independence 
associated with governance (for example, Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 6).    
 
Consequently, the identification of the ‘dominant model’ of British policy making has 
two main requirements.  First, there should be more meaningful comparisons between 
the competing approaches.
i
  Second, there should be greater clarity, within 
governance accounts, about the extent to which British Governments seek to impose 
policies from the top down - is the pursuit of top-down policymaking the exception or 
the norm?   
 
Accordingly, this article outlines two main approaches to describe and explain the 
‘characteristic and durable’ ways of doing things in Britain. The first is the ‘policy 
styles’ literature initiated by Richardson in Policy Styles in Western Europe (1982).  
The second is the Lijphart account found in Democracies (1984) and revised in 1999 
as Patterns of Democracy. These accounts point to very different interpretations and 
conclusions. The policy styles tool is associated with a policy community image (as 
described by Richardson and Jordan, 1979 and Jordan, 2005) that sees British 
policymaking as consensually driven.  It represents a major building block in the 
development of the ‘governance’ narrative, highlighting the diffusion of power from 
the centre of government and the tendency within British Government to consult and 
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negotiate rather than merely exercise power and impose decisions from the top-down.  
The Lijphart approach describes British government as the epitome of a top down, 
majoritarian and competitive system akin to the Westminster model. These two 
approaches are both commonly cited, but without much recognition of their mutual 
incompatibility. 
 
The Policy Communities Approach  
The ‘policy community’ term was originally advanced to signal a move away from 
studies centring on an adversarial parliamentary arena where successive changes of 
government would lead to major changes in policy imposed from the top down. In 
other words, it was a direct challenge to the as-yet-unlabelled ‘Westminster model’.   
Richardson and Jordan (1979: 73-74) argued that policy-making tended to be made: 
... and administered between a myriad of inter connecting, 
interpenetrating organisations. It is the relationship involved in 
committees, the policy community of departments and groups, and the 
practices of co-option and the consensual style, that better account for 
policy outcomes than do examinations of party stances, of manifestos 
and parliamentary influence (original emphasis). 
 
Their key publication, Governing Under Pressure (1979), was written on the back of 
a number of original case studies and informed by other case study authors.  These 
empirical exercises encouraged the dismantling of the emphasis on Parliament in prior 
accounts of British policy making (they echoed Ovenden, 1978, who was surprised at 
how little Parliament mattered in his account of The Politics of Steel).  The case 
studies did not start with an intention to undermine the parliamentary ‘story’ but 
found important decisions being made outside Parliament, and parliamentary 
exchanges merely echoing briefings from the interested groups. The general finding 
was that the parliamentary arena was far less important in determining outcomes than 
the world of civil servants and interested, well informed, groups and associations. 
Consequently, they concluded that ‘the traditional model of Cabinet and 
parliamentary government is a travesty of reality’ (1979: 91). 
 
The case studies were part of an ESRC project conducted by Richard Kimber and 
Jeremy Richardson. Their approach was to select policy fields and then look for active 
case studies under these headings.  They did not start by chasing newspaper headlines 
and looking at ‘interesting’ cases (typical of research at the time; researchers were led 
to cases that attracted media attention, and the media tended to feed off parliamentary 
controversy). Rather, they focused on examples of ‘normal policy making’.  This 
distinction between the ‘high octane’ controversies and ‘below the radar’ negotiations 
became central to a focus on ‘real’ politics and the relationships between groups and 
governments.  Governing Under Pressure took to task the ‘adversary politics thesis’ 
which  had gained currency in the late 1970s as a justification for electoral reform: the 
adversarial style of politics in the UK combined with an electoral system which 
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exaggerates voting majorities causes regular changes of government and wholesale 
shifts in public policy (Finer, 1975).  In contrast, Richardson and Jordan (1979) 
argued that policy was more likely to be incremental and that changes of government 
did not cause wholesale shifts in policy.  While Finer (1975) relied on a very small 
number of interesting cases to identify the material effects of adversarial politics (and 
identified only one significant case – post-war steel privatisation and nationalisation), 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) identified multiple cases to demonstrate remarkable 
levels of policy continuity despite regular changes of government.   
 
Those looking for academic compromise might suggest that majoritarian politics 
accounts for important policy making while policy communities operate at the 
‘humdrum’ level.  However, this was not the Richardson and Jordan distinction. They 
found important business (without a party political dimension) transacted at 
community level, while much of the headline politics was of primarily symbolic 
importance (a finding that informs debates on the importance of agenda-setting 
decisions made at the ‘sectoral’ rather than the ‘subsectoral’ level - see Cavanagh et 
al, 1995; Jordan and Maloney, 1995; Rayner et al, 2001). In part, this was because 
most policy decisions were effectively beyond the reach or interest of government 
ministers.    The sheer size of government and its policy environment necessitates 
breaking policy down into more manageable issues involving a smaller number of 
interested and knowledgeable participants.  Therefore, most public policy is 
conducted primarily through small and specialist policy communities which process 
‘technical’ issues at a level of government not particularly visible to the public or 
Parliament, and with minimal ministerial or senior civil service involvement.   
 
These arrangements exist because there is a logic to devolving decisions and 
consulting with certain affected interests.  Ministers rely on their officials for 
information and advice.  For specialist issues, those officials rely on specialist 
organisations.  Those organisations trade that information/ advice (and other resources 
such as the ability to secure the agreement of its group membership or implement 
government policy) for access to, and influence within, government.  This exchange is 
based on the ‘logic of consultation’ with the most affected interests; it encourages 
group ‘ownership’ of policy and maximizes governmental knowledge of possible 
problems (Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Jordan and Maloney, 1997).  Given civil 
servants’ lack of political legitimacy, they are ‘ill placed to impose and conflict 
avoidance is likely to result’ (Jordan and Richardson, 1982: 84). Further, given civil 
servants’ lack of specialized knowledge, they are often dependent upon groups for 
information and advice. The result is policy communities, or policymaking 
relationships between those in formal positions of responsibility and those who seek 
to influence them.  The logic of this relationship holds regardless of the party of 
government.  Therefore, the types of radical policy shift often associated with a 
change of government are likely to be uncommon.   
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‘Policy community’ described very loosely (Jordan, 2005) an often-close and broadly 
‘clientelistic’ relationship between civil servants and interest groups.  Governments 
tended to be internally divided, with competing parts of the bureaucracy keen to 
advance the interests of client groups with whom they shared broad priorities. The 
term was initially used simply to identify the blurry (not invisible) lines between 
formal policymaking and informal influence roles. As the literature developed, so too 
did the idea that membership of that community is based in part on the willingness of 
all members to accept certain informal ‘rules of the game’ or norms of behaviour.  
 For example, when civil servants and certain interest groups form relationships, they 
recognise the benefits - such as stability and policy continuity - of attempting to 
insulate their decisions from the wider political process.  Inclusion within the 
community may require the development of personal trust and the emergence of a 
‘common culture’ with high agreement on the nature and solutions to policy 
problems.   
 
The stated meaning of ‘community’ changed as commentators and (especially) critics 
tended to exaggerate the exclusivity required of the arrangements – making them 
easier to discredit empirically.  ‘Policy community’ was eventually described as a 
particular type of policy network characterised by close and insulated relationships 
between an exclusive elite (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  Such classifications of 
networks were soon followed by theological debates on their nature and explanatory 
value (for example, Dowding, 1995; Marsh and Smith, 2000; Dowding, 2001; 
Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012).  This over-intellectualisation detracted from the 
relatively simple, original use of ‘policy community’ to capture the ‘post 
parliamentary’ UK and the idea that ‘normal’ British policymaking was characterised 
by stable and often-consensual relationships between groups and government.   
Policy Communities and the Unexceptional ‘British’ Policy Style  
Richardson and Jordan’s Governing Under Pressure set up the provocative argument 
that the identification of policy communities represented ‘an alternative approach to 
comparative government’ (1979: 163). It implied that the UK was one variant of a 
general European model of policy making in which interest groups play a central role 
(1979: 170; extending the ‘European Polity’ propositions in Heisler and Kvavik, 
1974). It claimed that, ‘in most European countries, discussion of the policy-making 
system has moved from a parliamentary, elective perspective to the functional 
representation area’ (1979: 157).  In this context, Policy Styles In Western Europe 
(Richardson, 1982) set out to identify the ‘British policy style’ as part of a wider 
examination of the extent to which different political systems had distinctive, 
national, policy styles. The aim was to provide a framework in which these 
differences could be set out systematically.  There was no assumption that one single 
policy style could be used to characterize all behavior in a single country (since there 
would be variation across sectors, systems and time) but the expectation was that a 
default ‘tendency’ might frequently emerge; that national styles would, to a large 
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extent, be divergent (1982: 14) even if linked increasingly to the group-government 
rather than parliamentary arenas.   
The cumulative data from the national-level chapters suggested that there was a 
significant degree of policy making convergence that transcended the constitutional 
variations in different political systems.  The ‘policy community’ idea, initially 
thought to be a key UK characteristic (Richardson and Jordan, 1979) was also found 
to be applicable across Europe and there was a remarkably limited degree of variation 
found in ostensibly different regimes (this degree of convergence is also identified by 
Freeman
ii
).   Britain was found to be more like continental Europe than expected, and 
widespread empirical observations indicated that the most important trend in 
European policy making arrangements was convergence towards consultation and 
group incorporation.   
 
The ‘policy style’ aim was to identify, and label, the ‘standard operating procedures’ 
of political systems (Richardson et al, 1982: 2). Policy style was presented 
(Richardson et al, 1982: 12-13) as essentially reflecting: (a) the government’s 
approach to problem-solving (anticipatory/ reactive, which might now be described as 
radical/ incremental) and (b) the relationship between the government and other actors 
in the policy process (impositional/ consultative).  These dimensions of policy style 
generated two axes and four sectors to allow broad comparisons between systems 
(figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: A National Policy Style 
 
Source: Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan (1982: 13) 
 
As figure 1 suggests, the national case studies in the volume (including the UK) 
tended to cluster towards the upper right hand, reactive-consensual quadrant and 
signal a high degree of cross national convergence. The direction of change towards 
consensus building appeared almost uniform despite the existence of different 
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constitutional arrangements. Consequently, the policy styles literature helps us go 
beyond the ‘headline’ comparisons of institutions.  Richardson’s (1982) volume 
suggests that it is dangerous to read off policymaking behaviour from formal 
institutions; that formal institutional structures do not determine policy making styles.  
Rather, countries share a ‘standard operating procedure’ based on an incremental 
approach to policy and an attempt to reach consensus with interest groups, not impose 
decisions.  Most policymakers recognise the value of building on past policies – or 
they only have the cognitive ability and political resources to impose their will in a 
very small number of areas.  They also operate within the context of a shared set of 
ideas about the nature of policy problems and how they should be solved, and it is 
rare for policymakers to reject the established knowledge that underpins existing 
policy (or, it might be reasserted when the implementation of policy is left to other 
organisations). 
 
Consequently, the ‘British policy style’ may be best seen as consultative and non-
radical despite the UK’s majoritarian image.  This conclusion has been reinforced in 
an impressive number of studies comparing British policymaking with that of other 
countries (and the European Union) (Kriesi, Adam and Jochum, 2006; Larsen, Taylor-
Gooby and Kananen, 2006; Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Bovens et al., 2001; John, 
1998: 42–4; see also Barzelay and Gallego, 2010: 298 on France, Italy, and Spain; 
Knill and Tosun, 2012: 32-6) and the devolved UK experience (Cairney, 2008; 2009; 
2011a; 2011b; 2011c).     
 
The Lijphart Approach: Majoritarian versus Consensus Democracies 
Lijphart’s (1984; 1999) framework outlines a contrasting way to characterise national 
styles.  For him, normal institutional structures do determine policymaking styles - or, 
at least, they help explain very different policymaking traditions and behaviour in 
different political systems.  In particular, the electoral rules strongly influence post 
electoral politics. Lijphart’s (1999: 2) argument is that there are two basic models of 
electoral and political system design: those that concentrate power in the hands of the 
few (majoritarian) and those that ‘share, disperse, and limit power’ (consensus) (see 
table 1).   
 
Table 1: Lijphart’s Majoritarian-Consensus Dichotomy 
Institutional Divisions Majoritarian Democracy Consensus Democracy 
Executive Power  Concentrated in single party 
majority cabinet 
Shared in broad multiparty 
coalition 
Executive-legislative 
Relationship 
Executive is dominant. Balance of power between 
executive and legislature 
Party System Two party system Multiparty system 
Electoral System Majoritarian and 
disproportional (based on a 
plurality of votes) 
Proportional 
Interest Group System Pluralist free-for-all Coordinated and corporatist, 
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competition among groups exhibiting compromise and 
concertation 
Federal-Unitary Unitary and centralised Federal and decentralised 
Legislative Power Concentrated in unicameral 
legislature 
Divided between two equally 
strong houses 
Illustrative examples New Zealand, United 
Kingdom 
Switzerland, Belgium, the EU 
Source: Lijphart (1999: 3-4).  See Cairney (2012a: 89) or Flinders (2010: 83) for a full comparison. 
 
In a majoritarian democracy the first-past-the-post voting system exaggerates the 
strength of the electoral winners by (in normal cases) producing a majority of seats in 
the legislature - even for a party which may have a minority of the national vote.   
This produces a concentration of power at the centre whereby (one party) cabinet 
policies are seamlessly turned into law by compliant, partisan, parliamentary 
majorities (although there are variations: majoritarian-federal systems diffuse power 
across institutions; unitary governments with weak second chambers do not).  Lijphart 
(1999: 2-3) associates majoritarian democracies with an ‘exclusive, competitive and 
adversarial’ mentality in which parties compete within parliament, interest groups are 
more likely to compete with each other than cooperate, and governments are more 
likely to impose policy from the top down than seek consensus.   
  
In a consensus democracy, the proportional electoral system generally produces no 
overall parliamentary majority, encouraging the formation of coalitions based on 
common aims. This spirit of ‘inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise’ (1999: 2) 
between parties also characterises  the relationships between groups and government, 
with groups more likely to cooperate with each other and governments more willing 
to form corporatist alliances (although note the differences between consensus-federal 
states like Switzerland and consensus-unitary states like Italy). 
 
While Lijphart claims (1999: 2) that both majoritarian and consensual arrangements 
can be democratic, he clearly has a favourite child. For example he claims that, ‘the 
consensus model tries to share, disperse and limit power in a variety of ways.’  In 
other words, the institutional framework produces a cultural effect: people 
compromise because they think they should (rather than they have no choice); and, 
sharing power is a normative preference rather than the consequence of necessity. 
 
In this light, the UK is widely assumed to be the country closest to the majoritarian 
model (the ‘Westminister’ and ‘majoritarian’ terms are used interchangeably by 
Lijphart), the democratically inferior system,
iii
 and the outlier of modern democratic 
practice. Lijphart (1984) assumed that the UK possessed coherent governments 
driving policy through with secure Parliamentary majorities; for him, British politics 
was associated with centralized, top down policy imposition.  Whereas Richardson 
and Jordan had emphasised consensus, Lijphart assumed that a majority party 
government did not need a policy consensus.  Rather, a majority government could 
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decide, impose and implement.  In contrast to a policy community approach which 
‘Europeanized’ the UK experience, Lijphart (1984) presented the UK as exceptional; 
as the leading alternative to a more general European practice.   
 
The Lijphart account has been hegemonic in large parts of the profession for at least 
25 years. Part of its appeal may be that it offered a new discourse about European 
polities that made smaller European cases more central to political analysis, and hence 
this generated a widespread (and strangely uncritical)  interest among non Anglo 
American political scientists (Jordan, 2011). Not surprisingly, enthusiastically 
approving assessments are not hard to find (for example, Wilsford, 2000: 1; Grofman, 
1997), while many major textbooks still reinforce the Lijphart approach (for example, 
Newton and van Deth, 2010: 146-9; 285-6).  This support extends to Flinders’ (2005; 
2010: 15; Flinders and Curry, 2008) framework in a comparison of policymaking in 
UK and devolved governments.  In effect, Flinders (2010: 176) gives new life to the 
Lijphart model by identifying ‘bi-constitutionality’ following the concurrent 
development of consensus democracy-type institutions in the devolved territories (and 
further non-majoritarian measures such as the granting of independence to the Bank 
of England) and the maintenance of majoritarian institutions and practices in UK 
central government. Flinders’ important work confirms that this is a live rather than 
historical debate: the Lijphart approach is still central to the discipline. Two factors 
thus suggest that a comparison between the Lijphart and policy communities 
frameworks would be useful.  First, within the academic literature there is remarkably 
little careful debate and too many claims that dismiss competing arguments without 
giving them a full consideration.  Second, Lijphart’s framework is both  incredibly 
well cited and current: it cannot simply be dismissed as providing an outmoded image 
of British government (Patterns of Democracy has over 4430 citations in Google 
Scholar; and his arguments are still reproduced  in many contemporary texts on the 
UK). 
 
Policy Communities or Majoritarian Government?  
Given the very different conclusions about the nature of the British government that 
flowed from these approaches, that were both created almost three decades ago, 
remarkably little analysis or evidence has been produced to establish which is the 
more convincing generalization.  Flinders (2010) rightly points to new developments 
that undermine the fit of a modern UK to the original Lijphart model of 
majoritarianism. There may also be reason to believe that the 2010 general election 
result, producing coalition government, can be repeated regularly (Curtice, 2010), 
prompting the prospect of cultural change at the heart of government as parties may 
feel the need to adapt to the requirement to cooperate regularly with other parties. 
However, the debate outlined in this article is more fundamental.  It goes to the heart 
of different ways to understand governance. The argument here is not that Lijphart is 
now ‘less right’ after recent changes but, more starkly, that he has always 
misinterpreted the UK example. Of course some may well disagree with this reading, 
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but the argument here is that the tension between these models needs more 
investigation and argumentation rather than a simple declaration of preference.  The 
article presents five arguments to support a policy styles conclusion, but the main aim 
is to stimulate debate rather than closing it down by asserting a conclusion.   
 
1.  The UK never fit the majoritarian caricature. 
The first problem for the majoritarian argument is that Lijphart (1984) concedes so 
much ground, outlining a series of ways in which the UK does not fit the caricature. 
His discussion of the Westminster model is followed by a section entitled ‘British 
Deviations from the Westminster Model’ which is longer than the section outlining its 
majoritarian characteristics (1984: 9-16). It contains reservations such as: ‘the power 
of the majority should not be exaggerated’; ‘strong informal customs do restrain the 
majority’; ‘British politics was in close conformity with the Westminster model only 
in the twenty-five years from 1945-1970’; and, ‘there have been significant deviations 
from the Westminister model of majoritarian democracy with regard to almost all of 
the model’s nine characteristics.’  He notes that, ‘the simple picture of an omnipotent 
one–party cabinet using its parliamentary majority to carry out the mandate it has 
received from the voters is, and always has been, false and misleading ... in fact, it has 
long been recognized that in Britain and other democracies many organized groups 
complete for influence’.  Consequently, it may be worth treating Lijphart’s 
majoritarian model as, at best, a historical snapshot or, at worst, an ideal-type used as 
a contrast to what British government is really like.  In fact, pointing to a weak fit 
between the idealized form of majoritarianism and the empirical case of the UK may 
be following, rather than contradicting, Lijphart.  However, Lijphart’s contribution to 
the literature was not received in this way, partly because it was not always 
accompanied by these qualifications. Consequently, there is a danger that the 
literature now reproduces a caricature of the original Lijphart argument.  As is 
frequently the case, the author’s reservations get dropped as the headlines enter 
popular use.  
 
2. A majoritarian argument cannot rely simply on the alleged potential to act like a 
majoritarian government  
A key part of the majoritarian argument is the simple combination of (a) the 
observation that First Past the Post elections in Britain tend to produce single-party 
governing majorities (the 2010 election result notwithstanding) and (b) the assertion 
or assumption that such a majority party need not bargain and can pass legislation 
over the views of minorities in the legislature and the wider political community. 
Such views may often be held implicitly, but Flinders (2010: 75) also refers explicitly 
to ‘the institutional characteristics of the Westminster Model deriving logically from 
the basic meta-constitutional orientation of power-hoarding.’ These are legitimate but 
problematic deductions.  At best, they are problematic because formal institutions are 
not good predictors of behaviour, and such assertions should be better connected to 
detailed empirical work.   
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At worst, that empirical work (outlined below) suggests that the majoritarian image 
provides an inaccurate description of how British politics operates.  In the UK there is 
a large volume of informal discussion between groups and civil servants in 
government departments operating alongside a formal, elaborate system for 
consulting on policy proposals despite the UK government’s powerful position (for 
the latter, see http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/better-regulation/consultation-guidance).  
There are also extensive meetings between Ministers and groups, the volume of which 
would need to be better explained within a majoritarian model. For example, one 
website collating public information (http://whoslobbying.com) shows that from 
May–December 2010 there were 162 ministerial meetings with business and 
employer associations, 149 with trade associations, 133 trade unions, 91 with 
professional associations. The CBI alone had 76 meetings with Ministers and the 
TUC 45.  Who’s Lobbying shows that a huge percentage of political time is spent 
communicating with groups. It is hard to evaluate the importance of these meetings 
alone, but it is not credible that so many well respected, well resourced and expert 
associations would invest so much in them if they were totally cosmetic.  Or, at the 
very least, a more convincing majoritarian argument would have to explain what was 
going on.  The implication is often that the adversarial spirit in a majoritarian system 
extends to the group-government arena, with groups more likely to compete with each 
other and governments and groups unwilling to form consensual arrangements.  
However, if one starts with a majoritarian power-hoarding assumption, what is the 
need for governments to engage at all?   
 
3. The weightings may be wrong, but how do we know? 
Lijphart has critics such as Hazell (2008: 299) who argues that, ‘It is a weakness of 
Lijphart’s classification that it focuses narrowly on the formal powers granted to 
institutions, and can miss the significance of culture and behaviour.’  He points out 
that some of the British changes (such as a growing power of the House of Lords) do 
not impact on the Lijphart register and that there was more change than Lijphart was 
recording:  
 
More general strengthening of parliament relative to the executive; the 
growing power of the judiciary; growth in the legal constitution and the 
legalisation of politics; and delegation by politicians to independent, non-
majoritarian institutions. None of these developments score on Lijphart’s 
scale, so they do not affect his classification, which would still rate 
Westminster as heavily majoritarian in 2020.   
 
Flinders (2010: 82) abruptly rejects Hazell’s case (particularly on culture) as 
‘incorrect’.  In contrast, this article suggests that much change goes unnoticed if the 
measures of democracy are not sensitive to the details.  More importantly, this article 
goes further than Hazell to argue that the Lijphart classification misses or downplays 
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the most important factor: group-government relations.  Lijpart’s Democracies (1984) 
starts with a discussion of democracy that seems unexceptional but is significant. He 
notes that, in modern democracies, citizens generally act indirectly through 
representatives and rarely act directly to pursue their interests. This may look like 
routine scene setting by Lijphart, but it also signals a fixation that distorts subsequent 
discussion. If democracy resides, as he assumes, in the interactions of 
parliamentarians, then majority based systems are going to appear to be distinctive 
and less democratic. However, the policy community assumption is that democracy 
resides in extra parliamentary negotiations.  It suggests that the Lijphart calculations 
are not only opaque (his descriptions of the calculations are, at best, incomplete), but 
also weighted to generate ultimately misleading calculations based on arenas often far 
removed from the real action.   
 
Overall, if Lijphart’s measures are to be usefully operationalised, they should be 
recalibrated in two main ways.  First, the measures should be sensitive to the 
difference in importance between formal and informal relationships between groups 
and government (by for example, being sceptical about the value of formal 
mechanisms such as written agreements with groups and civic forums that promise 
much but often deliver little). Second, they should reflect the primary importance of 
the group-government arena.   
 
4. Majoritarian institutions and rhetoric co-existed with consensual practices 
Flinders (2010: 5) identifies a significant gap between ‘rhetorical principles’ and 
‘governing practice’ in the UK to describe the difference between Labour’s 
constitutional vision and the less impressive outcomes.   However, this gap has been 
present for longer in different ways.  The idea of the Westminster model encapsulates 
key rhetorical principles that have served as a ‘frame or legitimising framework’ 
(2010: 25) but been long disconnected from (or never connected to) modern practices.  
It can be argued that since Lijphart was not ‘tuned in’ to the detail of the domestic 
British literature he did not recognise that majoritarian institutions and rhetoric 
coexisted with consensual practices in Britain.  This point is simple but fundamental.   
 
Again, this article goes further than Flinders (2010: 26, who is worried that the 
‘legitimising framework’ only works when certain practices and customs are upheld 
and respected) to argue that the instinct to seek consent became one of the core values 
of the Westminster frame.  Flinders (2010: 31) cites Pollard’s comment of 1920 that 
the way the constitution operates is not so much conditioned by its form, ‘but upon 
the spirit which informs it.’  This fits the reality, as opposed to rhetoric, of British 
policymaking. The logic of consultation was strong, not only as a means to improve 
policy, but also because a central part of the democratic arrangement was an ethos of 
consent. The spirit that informed practice was consensual.  
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In this context, the Lijphart conception is a fallacy starting with a false dichotomy 
between majoritarian systems with centralized imposition and competitive, 
uncoordinated, pluralism and a consensus model which values social partnership and 
an emphasis on participation, consultation and compromise. A counter-argument is 
that, since consultation is democratically valued and usefully informative for policy 
makers, it is as likely to be a feature of ‘majoritarian’ systems as any other. It may 
appear to sit uncomfortably with long held majoritarian narratives, but only because 
the argument that ‘majorities don’t consult’ is false. Policymakers in majoritarian 
systems subscribe to the value of consent and have no interest in failing to benefit 
from the views of affected interests.  ‘Majoritarian’ is not a synonym for ‘dictatorial’ 
except in the field of straw men.  
 
Indeed, in some cases, majority systems may make the prospect of consultation more 
likely since there are no ‘partnership agreements’ between governing parties that 
produce ‘no go’ areas and fewer interest groups may be excluded from such prior 
decisions.  While it is a counter-intuitive proposition, it may be that coalition 
governments – the capstone of consensualist hopes - have (at least initially) more 
limited consultation with interests. For example, the intra-party bargaining between 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in 2010 meant that responsible Ministers 
had limited scope for the ‘business as usual’ extra party compromise with affected 
interests. There is a difference between party-led compromise and policy community 
consensus building – although it is possible that subsequent ‘U turns’ of coalitions 
result precisely because politically driven policy fails to anticipate problems that 
would normally be anticipated in policy communities.   
 
5.  The Lijphart interpretation seems to be at odds with the evidence-based literature   
The policy community approach built on an established British perspective reflected 
in the work of Beer (1966), Finer (1958), Stewart (1958), Self and Storing (1962), 
Eckstein (1960) and Banting (1979).  In other words, it was consistent with the 
dominant perspective that developed in British academic work.  Further, as policy 
histories have accumulated in Britain, they have been broadly affirmed (see, for 
example, Jordan, 1992).  As Borzel’s (2011: 51) review suggests, newer narratives of 
governance – which stress partnerships, networks, consultation and extra 
parliamentary bargaining – have continued this tradition: 
 
Networks provided a conceptual lens to describe a situation in which ‘the 
state’, that is, the British government, was no longer able to produce 
effective public policies without relying on the resources of other, 
predominantly non-state, actors. Central state functions got lost ‘upwards to 
the European Union, downwards to special purpose bodies and outward to 
agencies’ (Rhodes 1997, p.17; see also Jordan 1990; Richardson 19hg96). 
Governments have become increasingly dependent upon the cooperation 
and joint resource mobilization of policy actors outside their hierarchical 
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control (Jordan and Richardson 1983; Hanf and O’Toole 1992; Kickert et 
al. 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000). The separation between state and society 
becomes increasingly blurred: instead of emanating from a central 
authority, be this government or the legislature, policy today is in fact made 
in a process involving a plurality of both public and private organizations. 
(Mayntz 1993: 5) 
 
Further, these narratives are largely built on evidence of behaviour that would not be 
expected by a majoritarian model.  Consequently, the Lijphart and governance 
interpretations do not seem to be equally plausible; the thrust of Lijphart seems 
antithetical to the dominant governance perspective. In the dominant version of 
British government, the alleged irrelevance of Parliament to policymaking is not 
because of the policy imposition by partisan majorities, but because a swathe of 
policy is being resolved in consultative machinery outside parliament with weak party 
involvement.  In the more provocative accounts, partisanship is treated as irrelevant to 
the bulk of issues where policy agendas are so broad or too uncontroversial to invite 
partisan disagreements (even during phases of the election cycle when parties actively 
seek to produce policy differences).  The increasing political science focus on 
governance, policy communities, and networks of policymaking and delivery requires 
that the parliamentary focus is further marginalised.   
 
Such interpretations underline how far empirical scholarship has moved on in the UK. 
Further, a small but important proportion of this literature engages with the ideas of 
Lijphart.  Most notably, Kriesi, Adam and Jochum’s (2006: 357-8) study of seven 
Western European countries suggests that UK policy networks do not live up to their 
majoritarian reputations: ‘British policy networks turned out to be quite fragmented, 
resembling more closely those expected for consensus than for majoritarian 
democracies … This implies that future research should no longer aim at national 
level generalizations about power configurations and policy processes’. Kriesi et al’s 
(2006: 345) study suggests that the British policy style is relatively consensual despite 
its majoritarian political system, but in contrast, ‘the Italian style of policy-making 
appears to be more unilateral’ despite the fact that it, ‘has institutions which are rather 
of the more consensus-democratic type’, while the European Union is ‘less co-
operative than it appears at first sight’.  A similar approach is taken by Barzelay and 
Gallego (2010: 298) to criticise accounts which focus too much on national character 
traits (in this case in France, Spain and Italy) at the expense of knowledge of their 
subsystems.  Cairney (2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011b) also extends the UK comparison to 
the new ‘consensus democracies’ in Scotland and Wales, finding very similar policy 
styles despite their institutional differences.   
 
However, under the influence of the Lijphart approach, this well established British 
narrative on the UK has often been ignored outside the UK.  This is largely the 
understandable result of academic specialisation and ignorance of other fields, but it is 
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less excusable when analysis is built on selective ignorance; when phenomena ‘that 
will not fit the box are often not seen at all’ (Kuhn, 1970: 24). Some observers seem 
reluctant to recognise British consultation practices as central because the majoritarian 
argument seems to rule this out from first principles.   This position is required to 
present consensual systems as fundamentally different from British routines. In 
Lijphart’s world, national realities follow from analytical labels; evidence of the 
nature of the system does not determine which label is appropriate.  In Patterns of 
Democracy he claimed, ‘Competition and conflict also characterize the majoritarian 
model's typical interest group system: a system of free-for-all pluralism (1999: 16). 
This (unusually) verges on the empirical but it is largely asserted rather than 
demonstrated. Or, the evidence comes from a select group of academics referring to, 
and therefore confirming, each other’s assertions.  For example, Lijphart (1999: 17) 
reports that: 
 
As Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair (1995, p370) point out, 
Britain is "decidedly not a corporatist system” for two important reasons: "The 
first is the general lack of integration of both unions and management into the 
policymaking process. The second is the apparent preference of both sides for 
confrontational methods of settling their differences."  
 
This is ‘proving’ an assertion by citing another assertion influenced by the first 
assertion.  Further, a general textbook on Europe is not optimum primary evidence on 
British policy processes and the evidence provided in such broad comparative texts is 
so slight that it can be undermined too easily.   The British system does not operate in 
the way described by many introductory textbooks.  
 
Overall, the two main Lijphartian  forms (majoritarian and consensual) represent little 
more than analytical distinctions, designed partly to signal the normative value of 
consensus democracy, which provide little guide to the operations of British 
government and cloud academic comparisons of Britain and other countries or 
political systems.     
 
Policy Communities: Why are they so persistent?  Should they persist?   
Lijphart’s analysis is distinctive because there is often a strong normative argument 
operating alongside the analytical framework.  The policy communities (and, to a 
lesser extent, governance) literature focuses more on the realities of policymaking and 
spends less time discussing how British government should work.  However, there is 
often a normative dimension when the literature points out both the logic and benefits 
of consultation.  Further, its analysis reinforces the idea that the Westminster model 
ideal was incomplete without some recognition that it was underpinned by the 
adherence to certain principles about how Westminster institutions should be used.  In 
particular, the concept of ‘elective dictatorship’ (coined by Lord Hailsham, 1976) 
using parliamentary majorities was so worrying within the political class because it 
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was seen as an abuse of the democracy-with-consent principle. For Lijphart, elective 
dictatorship is the essence of British arrangements, but the desire for consent means 
that majoritarian systems are far nearer consensus democracies than Lijphart allowed. 
The drive for consent and the premium placed on consultation are key features of the 
unwritten constitution. Although the idea of ‘constitutional morality’ is nebulous 
(Flinders, 2010: 289) it still underpins British Government.   
 
Discussing British democracy without recognising the consent element is 
misrepresenting or misunderstanding its core morality and the nature of its 
‘constitution’.  As Tomkins (2009: 44) suggests, a constitution includes ‘all the rules, 
conventions and practices that describe or regulate the organisation, powers, and 
operation of government and the relations between private persons and public 
authorities’.  This wider focus helps demonstrate that ostensibly contrasting 
‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensus’ democracies actually share common rules, conventions 
and practices based on a commonly-adopted logic of consultation to secure consent.  
A focus on formal constitutional arrangements, which seem to be distinctive, masks 
the convergence of policy making processes linked to more-similar informal practices 
based on two key factors: (1) the functional benefits of input from policy users; and, 
(2) the importance of consent in all democratic arrangements.  There are tendencies to 
converge, based on the ‘consult and consent’ principles held across different regimes 
with different constitutional set-ups.  
 
The Policy Styles in Western Europe position was that national distinctiveness on 
policy making was offset by a common tendency to, for example, place a high value 
on technical information (often held by affected interests).  Jordan (1981: 121) 
identified a ‘logic’ of policy making ‘which acts as a drive towards more stable, 
regulated and predictable relations’.  In other words, there is a functional logic as well 
as a consent imperative driving disparate systems to policy community type 
arrangements (at least in political systems that respect public and group opinion and 
like to present themselves as democratic). In this light, Jordan and Maloney (1997: 
558) identified a number of factors that account for the ‘Persistence of Policy 
Communities’: 
 
 Bargaining in sectoral environments 
 Predictable and enduring coalitions 
 Substantial agreement on problem definition 
 Low public profile (visibility) of decisions 
 Well defined jurisdiction over relevant decision area 
 Low party political attention level 
 Narrow and low scope of conflict within the community 
 A small number of participants, and  
 Restricted access for dissenting perspectives. 
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Many factors muddy the normative waters because the logic of consultation is often 
about power and agenda setting, or the exclusion of certain groups and the reduction 
of political competition.  Consequently, in the five main points expanded below, the 
suggestion is that common pressures and tendencies exist as a consequence of 
democratic policy making and have considerable impact regardless of the formal 
constitutional context – but the desirability of some of these common outcomes and 
procedures may be more open to question.  Indeed, if the policy community narrative 
is accepted, this normative question may provide the more fruitful debate. 
 
1. Segmentation and Specialization 
By the 1960s, the dominant image of political life in academic accounts was not 
competitive pluralism but rather some kind of corporate or segmented pluralism; 
competition was not ‘open’ and access was denied to groups who did not enjoy 
clientelistic relations with departments or agencies. Groups were seen to be 
specializing in particular areas to increase the perception of them as authoritative 
sources of information.  Jordan and Maloney quote Browne (1990: 500) to make point 
that: 
... each policy domain is like a market place in which services are the 
interest group's unit of exchange. ... the services of various interest 
group suppliers (and their policymaker consumers) constitute 
worthwhile goods that are the basis for exchanges, or transactions, that 
facilitate policy-making ... organized interests develop issue identities 
 indeed are compelled to do so  because their representatives must 
have something recognizable to market within some one or more 
relevant networks of decision making. 
 
The decomposition of issues into specialist sub-units has the advantage (for some) of 
keeping matters ‘low key’. Technical issues are unlikely to attract the attention of the 
wider political system and, consequently, the policy community is licensed to deal 
with them. Policy specialization meant that increasingly there were more and more 
narrow, discrete and selective interests speaking with authority about the issue at hand 
(1990: 14-15). Segmentation became politically desirable not only through its 
encouragement of conflict avoidance, but also as a means to avoid intellectual 
overload. Through the standard operating procedure of bureaucratic accommodation, 
a relationship pattern developed which ‘tends to keep issues off the party political 
agenda’ (Jordan and Richardson, 1982: 82; particularly when an issue appears to have 
been solved after a surge of public concern – Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  
 
2. Trust and Shared Appreciation 
This style of policy making implies that relationships between certain groups and 
government are based on mutual trust. This begins with expertise.  Berry (1984: 119) 
describes how the lobbyist has to develop a reputation as a reliable source, claiming 
that access is attained through proving one's credentials as an expert  sharing a 
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common (expert) language with other key policymaking participants: ‘... the key to 
being a good lobbyist ... [is] to have them depend on you for your area of expertise'. It 
then continues with trust based on reliability.  Jordan and Maloney reproduce a classic 
Finer (1958: 34) quote from the director of a national trade association claiming that 
departmental recognition: 
 
... depends primarily on the statesmanlike (sic) way which the 
association handles its problems and on the confidence inspired by the 
staff in their dealings with government officials ... government officials 
will trust the staff sufficiently to inform and consult them on matters 
which are still highly confidential ... but if there is the slightest 
suspicion that the association's staff has failed to maintain the 
confidential nature of the information imparted to it, the government 
officials will shut up like clams and it will be a very long time before 
the association's staff is entrusted with inside information. 
 
3. Exchange-Based Relations and Power Dependency 
The policy community argument relies on the existence of exchange-based relations 
between actors. Participants know each other well, allowing differences within policy 
communities to be resolved through trading over time and revisiting important areas.  
Above all, the community will strive to avoid heightening conflict among its 
participants. Partisan politics exaggerates differences but community politics tries to 
turn conflict into the stuff of compromise. Even when political conflict emerges to 
take policies outside the scope of policy communities, the logic of policymaking tends 
to reassert itself and policy community-type features can emerge in the context of the 
conflict. On many occasions, the resolution of high profile controversies requires 
disaggregation into a series of less contentious manageable facets that can be 
addressed within policy community arrangements. The politics of the policy 
community is the politics of the particular; a means to resolve the detail.  In other 
words, the policymaking process operates on an exchange basis because Departments 
require relevant information (which the groups possess) and consent (which has a 
particular virtue in democratic settings). The Department often needs co-operation in 
the administration of policy. The groups clearly have need of the Department because 
assistance is needed to advance the goals of the organization. They are 
interdependent. 
  
4. Stability: Order and Routine Decisions 
Ripley and Franklin (1984: 10) argue that: 
 
Since most policy making is routine most of the time, subgovernments can 
often function for key periods of time without much interference or control 
from individuals or institutions outside the subgovernment. If the members ... 
can reach compromise among themselves ... they can reduce the chances of 
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calling a broader audience together that might become involved in their 
activities and output. 
 
In other words, while complexity and conflict may be commonplace, there still 
appears to be ‘a search for predictability in policy making that encourages the 
development of a symbiotic relationship between groups and civil servants,’ (Jordan 
and Maloney, 1997: 571). 
 
5. The Nature of Demands 
A further factor pushing for the emergence of stable subgovernments or communities 
is that many issues pursued by groups have little ideological or partisan significance. 
The day-to-day business of government is dominated by these apparently innocuous 
issues.  As Freeman (1965: 33) argues: 
Many of the decisions reached in subsystems, though they be 
considered minor or detailed or insignificant ... are collectively the 
stuff of which a large share of our total public policy is made ... their 
cumulative importance as well as their specific importance ... cannot 
be disregarded. 
Further, most of the content of policy community are vital to the participants. 
Schlozman and Tierney (1986: 396; 315; 311) point out that: 
... (a pressure group's) probability of success appears to vary inversely 
with the scope of the demand. Organizations whose political ends are 
narrow and technical are more likely to be influential than those whose 
goals are more encompassing. In general it is easier to affect the details 
of policy than its broad outlines …Thus even if the impact of 
organized interests were confined to influencing details ... such 
influence should not be dismissed as negligible.  
In other words, a group seeking changes in areas where there are no contested values 
or goals has an easier task. Further, this type of activity may represent the bulk of 
government activity in most political systems. 
 
Conclusion: The Ubiquity of Specialisation, Power and Agenda Setting? 
A further, perhaps controversial, step in this line of argument is that these factors are 
present in all political systems where governments try to build electoral support, 
secure consent from affected interests, and improve policy detail by the input of 
affected groups. They exist in all modern political systems irrespective of 
constitutional form - and British government is no different.   The British style uses 
elaborate consultation to try to satisfy a key interpretation of the idea of democratic 
consent.  Indeed, if the concept of political culture could be pinned down and made 
less ambiguous, consent would be a key element. Civil servants prefer to have the 
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groups ‘on side’ to satisfy a widely held belief in the legitimation of policy by those 
affected – or, more pragmatically, to pre-empt criticism and avoid conflict. 
 
These twin factors - the search for policy improvement and policy acceptance – are 
present in both ‘majoritarian’ and’ consensus’ systems.  Their presence undermines 
the idea that majoritarianism was ever a good description of the British situation. 
Consensus has long been seen as both democratically and politically valuable and 
hence often (normally) there was an attempt to reach agreement with  affected interest 
groups rather than the ‘top down’ imposition of  decisions. This premium placed on 
agreement reflected the perceived merit of democratic consent and, more cynically 
perhaps, a reduction of political friction, noise and governmental unpopularity. 
Indeed, Lijphart (1984: 9-16) himself, in his description of ‘British Deviations from 
the Westminster Model’, did not subscribe to the caricature account often 
promulgated in his name.  Further, more recent attempts by the Labour government to 
change the constitutional settlement (described by Flinders, 2010) may largely be seen 
as inconsequential froth on a settled pattern of consensus seeking. These factors that 
drive consensus building operate quite independent of constitutional frames.  
 
Of course, the main challenge to this argument is that it does not account for the small 
number of examples of high profile, high conflict policy issues in which the UK 
Government tries to impose policy from the top-down or otherwise departs from the 
‘normal’ policy style.  Clearly, the UK system does not consist simply of the 
mechanical processing of all policy in policy style communities - especially during an 
economic crisis of the current scale which forces governments to make tougher 
political choices with more winners and losers. However, the policy communities 
argument is that a substantial proportion of policy eventually gets settled with 
interested and knowledgeable organisations that deliver the information and the 
consent that policymakers value. Indeed, consent is something that is valued even 
without the policy community form: ‘Even where there is a multiplicity of conflicting 
participants the instinct for compromise, consultation and exchange can smooth over 
the political problems’ (Jordan, 1992: 272) 
 
Overall, what is the dominant interpretation of British policymaking?  Is the pursuit of 
top-down policymaking the exception or the norm?  Most contemporary analysts 
reject the ‘Westminster model’ in favour of governance accounts, but there is some 
confusion about their respective understandings of policymaking.  While the 
Westminster account may be relatively clear, stressing majoritarian government and 
policy imposition, governance accounts may vary, with some seeking to incorporate 
the idea of policy imposition into a broader narrative on the limits to centralisation.  
Indeed, those pursuing academic mediation might suggest that the dominant 
interpretation includes elements of the Westminster and governance models: 
majoritarianism best describes the policy process when ‘headline’ decisions are taken 
at the centre of political systems, while the governance image may be used to describe 
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the more humdrum else day-to-day running of government.   However, this article 
suggests that such compromise does not ‘square’ policy communities and Lijphart 
accounts.  The former account suggests that the majority of important government 
business is transacted beyond the headlines in other, less visible and less partisan 
arenas.  Consequently, the Lijphart’s ‘majoritarian versus consensus democracy’ 
account fails to describe or explain British policymaking adequately, since the bulk of 
business is not transacted in the arenas which command most of Lijphart’s attention.  
The Lijphart account, which is still remarkably prominent in international political 
science, provides a misleading interpretation of British policymaking to comparative 
scholars who are less familiar with the UK literature on governance, networks, 
bargaining and consensus seeking.   
  
Consequently, the article encourages scholars to reject an appealing compromise 
between majoritarian and governance accounts.  If the aim is to present clear and 
consistent accounts of British policymaking then the solution is to make choices after 
direct comparisons of competing accounts and to reject scholarly accounts which 
present a caricature of the UK based on formal institutions and reputations, in favour 
of an examination of the evidence of how they actually operate.  The policy 
community argument is that there has always been a surprising degree of consensual 
activity in the UK despite confrontational headlines and political rhetoric.  The thrust 
of this piece, and the main complaint about the Lijphart contribution, is that political 
science needs case study knowledge accumulation to confirm first principles 
speculation; there is a limit to the utility of deduction from first principles. Democracy 
is a phenomenon that deserves empirical study rather than simply the discussion of 
the imagined consequences of constitutional arrangements.  This is a point that goes 
well beyond a critique of Lijphart towards any discussion of British policymaking in 
the modern era.  Policymaking arrangements may be changing.  For example, they 
may now be under threat because the end of the steady public expenditure expansion 
that has existed since the Second World War has made it impossible for discontent to 
be consistently ‘bought off’. However, this is a phenomenon that should be researched 
and demonstrated rather than assumed and asserted.  Straying too far from real cases 
might get political science into interesting, but ultimately fruitless, debate.  
 
Acknowledgements: the article is based on papers presented by Jordan and Cairney at 
the Graduate School of Law, Hokkaido University, September 2011.  We would like 
to thank our host Professor Mikine Yamazaki.  
 
References 
Adam, S. and Kriesi, H. (2007) ‘The Network Approach’ in Sabatier, P. (ed.) 
Theories of the Policy Process 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 
Atkinson, M. and Coleman, W. (1989) ‘Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral 
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies’, British Journal of Political 
Science, 19, 1, 47-67  
23 
 
Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (2004a) ‘Multi-level Governance and the Study of the 
British State’, Public Policy and Administration, 19, 1, 31-51   
Banting, K (1979) Poverty, Politics and Policy (London: Macmillan)  
Barzelay, M. and Gallego, R. (2010) ‘The Comparative Historical Analysis of Public 
Management Policy Cycles in France, Italy, and Spain: Symposium Conclusion’, 
Governance, 23, 2, 297-307 
Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B. (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics  
(Chicago: Chicago University Press) 
Beer. S. (1966) Modern British Politics (London: Faber) 
Berry, J. (1984) The Interest Group Society (Boston: Little Brown)  
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2003) Interpreting British Governance (London: 
Routledge) 
Blunkett, D. and Richards, D. (2011) ‘Labour In and Out of Government: Political 
Ideas, Political Practice and the British Political Tradition’, Political Studies Review, 
9, 2, 178-92 
Borzel, T. (2011) ‘Networks, Reified Metaphor or Governance Panacea’, Public 
Administration, 89, 1, 49–63 
Bovens, M., ‘t Hart, P. Peters, Albaek, E., Busch, A., Dudley, G., Moran, M. and 
Richardson, J. (2001) ‘Patterns of governance: sectoral and national comparisons’ in 
M. Bovens, P. ‘tHart and B.G. Peters (eds.) Success and Failure in Public 
Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 
Browne, W.P.  (1990) ‘Organized Interests and their Issue Niches’, Journal of 
Politics, 52,2, 477-509. 
Browne, W P (1995) Cultivating Congress (Lawrence: U P of Kansas) 
Cairney, P. (2002) ‘New Public Management and the Thatcher Health Care Legacy’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4, 3: 375–98 
Cairney, P. (2008) ‘Has Devolution Changed the British Policy Style?’ British 
Politics, 3, 3, 350-72 
Cairney, P. (2009) “The ‘British Policy Style’ and Mental Health: Beyond the 
Headlines”, Journal of Social Policy, 38, 4, 1-18  
Cairney, P. (2011a) The Scottish Political System Since Devolution: From New 
Politics to the New Scottish Government (Exeter: Imprint Academic) 
Cairney, P. (2011b) ‘The New British Policy Style: From a British to a Scottish 
Political Tradition?’, Political Studies Review, 9, 2, 208-20 
Cairney, P. (2011c) ‘Compulsory Education Policy in Scotland since Devolution’, 
Seminar series 'Education and its Social Context: Policy in the UK post devolution’, 
University of Edinburgh, April 
Cairney, P. (2012a) Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave) 
Cairney, P. (2012b) ‘Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland: what was the SNP 
effect?’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14, 2, 231-49 
Cairney, P. (2012c) ‘'Public administration in an age of austerity': Positive lessons 
from policy studies’, Public Policy and Administration, 27, 3, 230-47 
24 
 
Cavanagh, M., Marsh, D. And Smith, M. (1995) The Relationship Between Policy 
Networks At The Sectoral And Sub-Sectoral Levels: A Response To Jordan, Maloney 
And McLaughlin’, Public Administration, 73, 4, 627–629,  
Curtice, J. (2010) ‘The Last Post’, Parliamentary Brief (online), 19 May 
http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2010/05/the-last-post#all 
Dowding, K. (1995) ‘Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network 
Approach’, Political Studies, 43, 2, 136-58 
Dowding, K. (2001) ‘There Must Be End to Confusion’, Political Studies, 49, 1, 89-
105 
Eckstein (1960) Pressure Group Politics (London: Allen and Unwin) 
Fawcett, P. and Daugbjerg, C. (2012) ‘Explaining Governance Outcomes: 
Epistemology, Network Governance and Policy Network Analysis’, Political Studies 
Review, 10, 2, 195-207 
Finer, S.  (1958) Anonymous Empire (London: Pall Mall).  
Finer, S. (1975) Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform (London: Wigram) 
Flinders, M. (2005) ‘Majoritarian democracy in Britain’, West European Politics, 28, 
1, 61-93. 
Flinders, M. (2010) Democratic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Flinders, M. And Curry, D. (2008) ‘Bi-constitutionality: Unravelling New Labour’s 
Constitutional Orientations’, Parliamentary Affairs, 61, 1, 99-121 
Freeman, G. (1985) ‘National Styles and Policy Sectors’, Journal of Public Policy, 5, 
4, 467 -496. 
Freeman, J. L.  (1965) The Political Process (Garden City, NY: Doubleday) 
Grofman, B. (1997) Arend Lijphart and the New Institutionalism, CSD Working 
Paper 5/15/ U of Irvine.  
Hailsham, L. (1976) ‘Elective dictatorship’, The Listener: 496–500. 21st October 
1976. 
Hazell, R. (2008) ‘Conclusion’ in Hazell (ed) Constitutional Futures Revisited 
(Palgrave) 
Heisler, M. and Kvavik, R. (1974), ‘Patterns of European Politics’, in M Heisler (ed)  
Politics in Europe  (NY: David McKay)  
John, P. (1998) Analysing Public Policy (London: Continuum) 
Jordan, G. (1981) ‘Iron Triangles. Woolly Corporatism and Elastic nets’ Journal of 
Public Policy, 1, 95-123. 
Jordan, G. (1990) ‘Policy Community Realism versus “New” Institutionalist 
Ambiguity’, Political Studies, 38: 470–84 
Jordan, G. (1992) Engineers and Professional Self Regulation. (Oxford: Clarendon) 
Jordan, G. (2005) ‘Bringing Policy Communities Back In?  A Comment on Grant’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7, 317-21 
Jordan, G. (2011) ‘Policy Styles Revisited: Still Communities, Still Consensual and 
Still Converging?’ Graduate School of Law, Hokkaido University, September 
25 
 
Jordan, A.G. and Richardson, J.J. (1982) ‘The British Policy Style or the Logic of 
Negotiation?’ in (ed) Richardson, J.J. Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen 
and Unwin) 
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. (1995) ‘Policy Networks Expanded: A Comment on 
Cavanagh, Marsh and Smith’, Public Administration, 73, 4, 630–4 
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W.  (1997) ‘Accounting for Subgovernments: Explaining the 
Persistence of Policy Communities’, Administration and Society, 29, 5, 557-583. 
Jordan, G., Richardson, J.J. and Kimber, R. (1977) ‘The origins of the Water Act’,  
Public Administration, 55, 3, 95-123 
Kerr, P. and Kettell, S. (2006) ‘In Defence of British Politics: The Past, Present and 
Future of the Discipline’, British Politics, 1, 1, 3-25 
Knill, C. And Tosun, J. (2012) Public Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave) 
Kriesi, H., Adam, S. and Jochum, M. (2006) ‘Comparative analysis of policy 
networks in Western Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, 3, 341–361  
Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1
st
 and 2
nd
 editions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Larsen, T., Taylor-Gooby, P. and Kananen, J. (2006) ‘New Labour’s Policy Style: A 
Mix of Policy Approaches’, Journal of Social Policy, 35, 4, 629-49  
Lijphart, A. (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus 
Government in Twenty One Countries (New Haven: Yale U P) 
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, Conn: Yale University 
Press) 
Mair, P. (2000) ‘Partyless Democracy: Solving the Paradox of New Labour’, New 
Left Review, 2, March/April, 21-35. 
Marsh, D. (2011) ‘The New Orthodoxy: The Differentiated Polity Model’, Public 
Administration, 89, 1, 32-48 
Marsh, D. (2008) ‘Understanding British Government: Analysing Competing 
Models’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10, 2, 251-69 
Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W (1992) “Policy Communities and Issue Networks: 
Beyond Typology” in  (eds) Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. Policy Networks in 
British Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Marsh, D. and Smith, M. (2000) ‘Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a 
Dialectical Approach’, Political Studies, 48, 1, 4-21 
Marsh, D. and Smith, M. (2001) ‘There is More Than One Way to Do Political 
Science’ Political Studies, 49,3, 528-41 
Newton, K. and van Deth, J. (2010) Foundations of Comparative Politics 2
nd
. Ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Ovenden, K. (1978) The Politics of Steel (London: Macmillan) 
Rayner, J., Howlett, M., Wilson, J., Cashore, B. and Hoberg, G. (2001) ‘Privileging 
the sub-sector: critical sub-sectors and sectoral relationships in forest policy-making’, 
Forest Policy and Economics, 2, 3-4, 319-332 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance (Open University Press) 
26 
 
Richardson, J. J. (ed.) (1982) Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen & 
Unwin) 
Richardson, J.J., Gustafson, G. and Jordan, G. (1982) ‘The Concept of Policy Style’ 
in Richardson Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen & Unwin) 
Richardson, J. and Jordan, G. (1979) Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process 
In A Post-Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Robertson) 
Ripley, R. and  Franklin, G. (1984) Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy, 3
rd
 
edn (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press) 
Self, P  and Storing, H  (1962) The State and the Farmer (London: Allen and Unwin)  
Stewart, J. (1958) British Pressure Groups (Oxford: Clarendon) 
Tomkins, A. (2009) ‘Constitutionalism’ in M Flinders, A Gamble, C Hay and  M 
Kenny (eds) The Oxford Handbook of British Politics (Oxford: Oxford U P) 
Wilsford, D. (2000) Studying Democracy and Putting it into Practice, In M Crepaz,  
T. Koelble and D Wilsford (eds) Democracy and Institutions: the Life Work of Arend 
Lijphart (University of Michigan Press) 
                                                 
i
 Note that the most high profile debates take place within the governance literature, such as the Marsh/ 
Rhodes debate which invokes first principles ideas about ontology and epistemology to establish the 
best way to understand modern governance arrangements  (Marsh, 2008; 2012; Bevir and Rhodes, 
2010; Rhodes, 2011).   
ii
 Freeman (1985: 467) noted that, before the emergence of comparative policy styles as a field of 
inquiry, ‘most political scientists had presumed that the peculiar and unique structure and organization 
of politics in particular countries – constitutional arrangements, party systems electoral devices, and 
political cultures – produced distinctive public policies.’ However, systematic cross system 
investigations, using data on outputs, contradicted this assumption, finding cross national similarities 
and that ‘politics was not a fundamental determinant of the policies of national states or their 
subdivisions.’ (1985: 467; although note that Freeman’s argument is based on the, now less 
fashionable, idea that socio-economic processes are more important than policymaking process in 
determining policy outcomes – see Cairney, 2012: 113-7; John, 2012: chapter 5).   
iii
 In developing his consensus democracy idea, Lijphart focused on undermining the traditional defence 
(clarity and political responsibility  through alternating administrations determined by public electoral 
choice between manifestos) of two party politics in the UK and US (the claimed virtues  of the 
Responsible Party Government idea probably reached a high point in  ‘Toward a More Responsible 
Party Government’ APSA Supplement, 1950).  Lijphart was rejecting the ‘responsible’ two party 
model and, in fact, campaigning for what he later (1999: 293) termed the ‘kinder, gentler qualities’ of 
consensus democracy.  He described his approach as ‘prescriptive’ (1984: 209). 
